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8e05cc1e6c5eb1729e06835baf9114c4be8b82ee
lix/src/libstore/platform/linux.cc
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Jade LovelaceandRebecca Turner 04f8a14833 tree-wide: shuffle headers around for about 30s compile time 
This didn't really feel so worth it afterwards, but I did untangle a
bunch of stuff that should not have been tangled.

The general gist of this change is that variant bullshit was causing a
bunch of compile time, and it seems like the only way to deal with
variant induced compile time is to keep variant types out of headers.
Explicit template instantiation seems to do nothing for them.

I also seem to have gotten some back-end time improvement from
explicitly instantiating regex, but I don't know why. There is no
corresponding front-end time improvement from it: regex is still at the
top of the sinners list.

**** Templates that took longest to instantiate:
 15231 ms: std::basic_regex<char>::_M_compile (28 times, avg 543 ms)
 15066 ms: std::__detail::_Compiler<std::regex_traits<char>>::_Compiler (28 times, avg 538 ms)
 12571 ms: std::__detail::_Compiler<std::regex_traits<char>>::_M_disjunction (28 times, avg 448 ms)
 12454 ms: std::__detail::_Compiler<std::regex_traits<char>>::_M_alternative (28 times, avg 444 ms)
 12225 ms: std::__detail::_Compiler<std::regex_traits<char>>::_M_term (28 times, avg 436 ms)
 11363 ms: nlohmann::basic_json<>::parse<const char *> (21 times, avg 541 ms)
 10628 ms: nlohmann::basic_json<>::basic_json (109 times, avg 97 ms)
 10134 ms: std::__detail::_Compiler<std::regex_traits<char>>::_M_atom (28 times, avg 361 ms)

Back-end time before messing with the regex:
**** Function sets that took longest to compile / optimize:
  8076 ms: void boost::io::detail::put<$>(boost::io::detail::put_holder<$> cons... (177 times, avg 45 ms)
  4382 ms: std::_Rb_tree<$>::_M_erase(std::_Rb_tree_node<$>*) (1247 times, avg 3 ms)
  3137 ms: boost::stacktrace::detail::to_string_impl_base<boost::stacktrace::de... (137 times, avg 22 ms)
  2896 ms: void boost::io::detail::mk_str<$>(std::__cxx11::basic_string<$>&, ch... (177 times, avg 16 ms)
  2304 ms: std::_Rb_tree<$>::_M_get_insert_hint_unique_pos(std::_Rb_tree_const_... (210 times, avg 10 ms)
  2116 ms: bool std::__detail::_Compiler<$>::_M_expression_term<$>(std::__detai... (112 times, avg 18 ms)
  2051 ms: std::_Rb_tree_iterator<$> std::_Rb_tree<$>::_M_emplace_hint_unique<$... (244 times, avg 8 ms)
  2037 ms: toml::result<$> toml::detail::sequence<$>::invoke<$>(toml::detail::l... (93 times, avg 21 ms)
  1928 ms: std::__detail::_Compiler<$>::_M_quantifier() (28 times, avg 68 ms)
  1859 ms: nlohmann::json_abi_v3_11_3::detail::serializer<$>::dump(nlohmann::js... (41 times, avg 45 ms)
  1824 ms: std::_Function_handler<$>::_M_manager(std::_Any_data&, std::_Any_dat... (973 times, avg 1 ms)
  1810 ms: std::__detail::_BracketMatcher<$>::_BracketMatcher(std::__detail::_B... (112 times, avg 16 ms)
  1793 ms: nix::fetchers::GitInputScheme::fetch(nix::ref<$>, nix::fetchers::Inp... (1 times, avg 1793 ms)
  1759 ms: std::_Rb_tree<$>::_M_get_insert_unique_pos(std::__cxx11::basic_strin... (281 times, avg 6 ms)
  1722 ms: bool nlohmann::json_abi_v3_11_3::detail::parser<$>::sax_parse_intern... (19 times, avg 90 ms)
  1677 ms: boost::io::basic_altstringbuf<$>::overflow(int) (194 times, avg 8 ms)
  1674 ms: std::__cxx11::basic_string<$>::_M_mutate(unsigned long, unsigned lon... (249 times, avg 6 ms)
  1660 ms: std::_Rb_tree_node<$>* std::_Rb_tree<$>::_M_copy<$>(std::_Rb_tree_no... (304 times, avg 5 ms)
  1599 ms: bool nlohmann::json_abi_v3_11_3::detail::parser<$>::sax_parse_intern... (19 times, avg 84 ms)
  1568 ms: void std::__detail::_Compiler<$>::_M_insert_bracket_matcher<$>(bool) (112 times, avg 14 ms)
  1541 ms: std::__shared_ptr<$>::~__shared_ptr() (531 times, avg 2 ms)
  1539 ms: nlohmann::json_abi_v3_11_3::detail::serializer<$>::dump_escaped(std:... (41 times, avg 37 ms)
  1471 ms: void std::__detail::_Compiler<$>::_M_insert_character_class_matcher<... (112 times, avg 13 ms)

After messing with the regex (notice std::__detail::_Compiler vanishes
here, but I don't know why):

**** Function sets that took longest to compile / optimize:
  8054 ms: void boost::io::detail::put<$>(boost::io::detail::put_holder<$> cons... (177 times, avg 45 ms)
  4313 ms: std::_Rb_tree<$>::_M_erase(std::_Rb_tree_node<$>*) (1217 times, avg 3 ms)
  3259 ms: boost::stacktrace::detail::to_string_impl_base<boost::stacktrace::de... (137 times, avg 23 ms)
  3045 ms: void boost::io::detail::mk_str<$>(std::__cxx11::basic_string<$>&, ch... (177 times, avg 17 ms)
  2314 ms: std::_Rb_tree<$>::_M_get_insert_hint_unique_pos(std::_Rb_tree_const_... (207 times, avg 11 ms)
  1923 ms: std::_Rb_tree_iterator<$> std::_Rb_tree<$>::_M_emplace_hint_unique<$... (216 times, avg 8 ms)
  1817 ms: bool nlohmann::json_abi_v3_11_3::detail::parser<$>::sax_parse_intern... (18 times, avg 100 ms)
  1816 ms: toml::result<$> toml::detail::sequence<$>::invoke<$>(toml::detail::l... (93 times, avg 19 ms)
  1788 ms: nlohmann::json_abi_v3_11_3::detail::serializer<$>::dump(nlohmann::js... (40 times, avg 44 ms)
  1749 ms: std::_Rb_tree<$>::_M_get_insert_unique_pos(std::__cxx11::basic_strin... (278 times, avg 6 ms)
  1724 ms: std::__cxx11::basic_string<$>::_M_mutate(unsigned long, unsigned lon... (248 times, avg 6 ms)
  1697 ms: boost::io::basic_altstringbuf<$>::overflow(int) (194 times, avg 8 ms)
  1684 ms: nix::fetchers::GitInputScheme::fetch(nix::ref<$>, nix::fetchers::Inp... (1 times, avg 1684 ms)
  1680 ms: std::_Rb_tree_node<$>* std::_Rb_tree<$>::_M_copy<$>(std::_Rb_tree_no... (303 times, avg 5 ms)
  1589 ms: bool nlohmann::json_abi_v3_11_3::detail::parser<$>::sax_parse_intern... (18 times, avg 88 ms)
  1483 ms: non-virtual thunk to boost::wrapexcept<$>::~wrapexcept() (181 times, avg 8 ms)
  1447 ms: nlohmann::json_abi_v3_11_3::detail::serializer<$>::dump_escaped(std:... (40 times, avg 36 ms)
  1441 ms: std::__shared_ptr<$>::~__shared_ptr() (496 times, avg 2 ms)
  1420 ms: boost::stacktrace::basic_stacktrace<$>::init(unsigned long, unsigned... (137 times, avg 10 ms)
  1396 ms: boost::basic_format<$>::~basic_format() (194 times, avg 7 ms)
  1290 ms: std::__cxx11::basic_string<$>::_M_replace_cold(char*, unsigned long,... (231 times, avg 5 ms)
  1258 ms: std::vector<$>::~vector() (354 times, avg 3 ms)
  1222 ms: std::__cxx11::basic_string<$>::_M_replace(unsigned long, unsigned lo... (231 times, avg 5 ms)
  1194 ms: std::_Rb_tree<$>::_M_get_insert_hint_unique_pos(std::_Rb_tree_const_... (49 times, avg 24 ms)
  1186 ms: bool tao::pegtl::internal::sor<$>::match<$>(std::integer_sequence<$>... (1 times, avg 1186 ms)
  1149 ms: std::__detail::_Executor<$>::_M_dfs(std::__detail::_Executor<$>::_Ma... (70 times, avg 16 ms)
  1123 ms: toml::detail::sequence<$>::invoke(toml::detail::location&) (69 times, avg 16 ms)
  1110 ms: nlohmann::json_abi_v3_11_3::basic_json<$>::json_value::destroy(nlohm... (55 times, avg 20 ms)
  1079 ms: std::_Function_handler<$>::_M_manager(std::_Any_data&, std::_Any_dat... (541 times, avg 1 ms)
  1033 ms: nlohmann::json_abi_v3_11_3::detail::lexer<$>::scan_number() (20 times, avg 51 ms)

Change-Id: I10af282bcd4fc39c2d3caae3453e599e4639c70b
2024-08-28 09:55:05 -07:00

1010 lines
41 KiB
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Raw Blame History

#include "build/worker.hh"
#include "cgroup.hh"
#include "finally.hh"
#include "gc-store.hh"
#include "signals.hh"
#include "platform/linux.hh"
#include "regex.hh"
#include "strings.hh"
#include <grp.h>
#include <regex>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#if HAVE_SECCOMP
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <seccomp.h>
#endif
namespace nix {
namespace {
/**
* The system for which Nix is compiled.
*/
[[gnu::unused]]
constexpr const std::string_view nativeSystem = SYSTEM;
}
void registerLocalStore() {
StoreImplementations::add<LinuxLocalStore, LocalStoreConfig>();
}
static void readProcLink(const std::string & file, UncheckedRoots & roots)
{
constexpr auto bufsiz = PATH_MAX;
char buf[bufsiz];
auto res = readlink(file.c_str(), buf, bufsiz);
if (res == -1) {
if (errno == ENOENT || errno == EACCES || errno == ESRCH) {
return;
}
throw SysError("reading symlink");
}
if (res == bufsiz) {
throw Error("overly long symlink starting with '%1%'", std::string_view(buf, bufsiz));
}
if (res > 0 && buf[0] == '/') {
roots[std::string(static_cast<char *>(buf), res)].emplace(file);
}
}
static void readFileRoots(const char * path, UncheckedRoots & roots)
{
try {
roots[readFile(path)].emplace(path);
} catch (SysError & e) {
if (e.errNo != ENOENT && e.errNo != EACCES) {
throw;
}
}
}
void LinuxLocalStore::findPlatformRoots(UncheckedRoots & unchecked)
{
auto procDir = AutoCloseDir{opendir("/proc")};
if (procDir) {
struct dirent * ent;
auto digitsRegex = std::regex(R"(^\d+$)");
auto mapRegex = std::regex(R"(^\s*\S+\s+\S+\s+\S+\s+\S+\s+\S+\s+(/\S+)\s*$)");
auto storePathRegex = regex::storePathRegex(storeDir);
while (errno = 0, ent = readdir(procDir.get())) {
checkInterrupt();
if (std::regex_match(ent->d_name, digitsRegex)) {
try {
readProcLink(fmt("/proc/%s/exe", ent->d_name), unchecked);
readProcLink(fmt("/proc/%s/cwd", ent->d_name), unchecked);
auto fdStr = fmt("/proc/%s/fd", ent->d_name);
auto fdDir = AutoCloseDir(opendir(fdStr.c_str()));
if (!fdDir) {
if (errno == ENOENT || errno == EACCES) {
continue;
}
throw SysError("opening %1%", fdStr);
}
struct dirent * fd_ent;
while (errno = 0, fd_ent = readdir(fdDir.get())) {
if (fd_ent->d_name[0] != '.') {
readProcLink(fmt("%s/%s", fdStr, fd_ent->d_name), unchecked);
}
}
if (errno) {
if (errno == ESRCH) {
continue;
}
throw SysError("iterating /proc/%1%/fd", ent->d_name);
}
fdDir.reset();
auto mapFile = fmt("/proc/%s/maps", ent->d_name);
auto mapLines =
tokenizeString<std::vector<std::string>>(readFile(mapFile), "\n");
for (const auto & line : mapLines) {
auto match = std::smatch{};
if (std::regex_match(line, match, mapRegex)) {
unchecked[match[1]].emplace(mapFile);
}
}
auto envFile = fmt("/proc/%s/environ", ent->d_name);
auto envString = readFile(envFile);
auto env_end = std::sregex_iterator{};
for (auto i =
std::sregex_iterator{
envString.begin(), envString.end(), storePathRegex
};
i != env_end;
++i)
{
unchecked[i->str()].emplace(envFile);
}
} catch (SysError & e) {
if (errno == ENOENT || errno == EACCES || errno == ESRCH) {
continue;
}
throw;
}
}
}
if (errno) {
throw SysError("iterating /proc");
}
}
readFileRoots("/proc/sys/kernel/modprobe", unchecked);
readFileRoots("/proc/sys/kernel/fbsplash", unchecked);
readFileRoots("/proc/sys/kernel/poweroff_cmd", unchecked);
}
#if HAVE_SECCOMP
static void allowSyscall(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, int syscall) {
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall, 0) != 0)
throw SysError("unable to add seccomp rule");
}
#define ALLOW_CHMOD_IF_SAFE(ctx, syscall, modePos) \
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall, 1, SCMP_A##modePos(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, S_ISUID | S_ISGID, 0)) != 0 || \
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), syscall, 1, SCMP_A##modePos(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, S_ISUID, S_ISUID)) != 0 || \
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), syscall, 1, SCMP_A##modePos(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, S_ISGID, S_ISGID)) != 0) \
throw SysError("unable to add seccomp rule");
static std::vector<struct sock_filter> compileSyscallFilter()
{
scmp_filter_ctx ctx;
// Pretend that syscalls we don't yet know about don't exist.
// This is the best option for compatibility: after all, they did in fact not exist not too long ago.
if (!(ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(ENOSYS))))
throw SysError("unable to initialize seccomp mode 2");
Finally cleanup([&]() {
seccomp_release(ctx);
});
if (nativeSystem == "x86_64-linux" &&
seccomp_arch_add(ctx, SCMP_ARCH_X86) != 0)
throw SysError("unable to add 32-bit seccomp architecture");
if (nativeSystem == "x86_64-linux" &&
seccomp_arch_add(ctx, SCMP_ARCH_X32) != 0)
throw SysError("unable to add X32 seccomp architecture");
if (nativeSystem == "aarch64-linux" &&
seccomp_arch_add(ctx, SCMP_ARCH_ARM) != 0)
printError("unable to add ARM seccomp architecture; this may result in spurious build failures if running 32-bit ARM processes");
if (nativeSystem == "mips64-linux" &&
seccomp_arch_add(ctx, SCMP_ARCH_MIPS) != 0)
printError("unable to add mips seccomp architecture");
if (nativeSystem == "mips64-linux" &&
seccomp_arch_add(ctx, SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64N32) != 0)
printError("unable to add mips64-*abin32 seccomp architecture");
if (nativeSystem == "mips64el-linux" &&
seccomp_arch_add(ctx, SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL) != 0)
printError("unable to add mipsel seccomp architecture");
if (nativeSystem == "mips64el-linux" &&
seccomp_arch_add(ctx, SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32) != 0)
printError("unable to add mips64el-*abin32 seccomp architecture");
// This list is intended for machine consumption.
// Please keep its format, order and BEGIN/END markers.
//
// Currently, it is up to date with libseccomp 2.5.5 and glibc 2.39.
// Run check-syscalls to determine which new syscalls should be added.
// New syscalls must be audited and handled in a way that blocks the following dangerous operations:
// * Creation of non-empty setuid/setgid files
// * Creation of extended attributes (including ACLs)
//
// BEGIN extract-syscalls
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(accept));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(accept4));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(access));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(acct));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(add_key));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(adjtimex));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(afs_syscall));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(alarm));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(arch_prctl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(arm_fadvise64_64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(arm_sync_file_range));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(bdflush));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(bind));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(bpf));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(break));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(breakpoint));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(brk));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(cachectl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(cacheflush));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(cachestat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(capget));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(capset));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(chdir));
// skip chmod (dangerous)
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(chown));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(chown32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(chroot));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(clock_adjtime));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(clock_adjtime64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(clock_getres));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(clock_getres_time64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(clock_gettime));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(clock_gettime64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(clock_nanosleep));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(clock_nanosleep_time64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(clock_settime));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(clock_settime64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(clone));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(clone3));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(close));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(close_range));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(connect));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(copy_file_range));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(creat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(create_module));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(delete_module));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(dup));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(dup2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(dup3));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(epoll_create));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(epoll_create1));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(epoll_ctl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(epoll_ctl_old));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(epoll_pwait));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(epoll_pwait2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(epoll_wait));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(epoll_wait_old));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(eventfd));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(eventfd2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(execve));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(execveat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(exit));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(exit_group));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(faccessat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(faccessat2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fadvise64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fadvise64_64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fallocate));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fanotify_init));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fanotify_mark));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fchdir));
// skip fchmod (dangerous)
// skip fchmodat (dangerous)
// skip fchmodat2 (dangerous)
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fchown));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fchown32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fchownat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fcntl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fcntl64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fdatasync));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fgetxattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(finit_module));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(flistxattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(flock));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fork));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fremovexattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fsconfig));
// skip fsetxattr (dangerous)
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fsmount));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fsopen));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fspick));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fstat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fstat64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fstatat64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fstatfs));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fstatfs64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fsync));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ftime));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ftruncate));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ftruncate64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(futex));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(futex_requeue));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(futex_time64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(futex_wait));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(futex_waitv));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(futex_wake));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(futimesat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getcpu));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getcwd));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getdents));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getdents64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getegid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getegid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(geteuid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(geteuid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getgid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getgid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getgroups));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getgroups32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getitimer));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(get_kernel_syms));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(get_mempolicy));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getpeername));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getpgid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getpgrp));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getpid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getpmsg));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getppid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getpriority));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getrandom));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getresgid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getresgid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getresuid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getresuid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getrlimit));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(get_robust_list));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getrusage));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getsid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getsockname));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getsockopt));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(get_thread_area));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(gettid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(gettimeofday));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(get_tls));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getuid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getuid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(getxattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(gtty));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(idle));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(init_module));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(inotify_add_watch));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(inotify_init));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(inotify_init1));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(inotify_rm_watch));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(io_cancel));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ioctl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(io_destroy));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(io_getevents));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ioperm));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(io_pgetevents));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(io_pgetevents_time64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(iopl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ioprio_get));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ioprio_set));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(io_setup));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(io_submit));
// skip io_uring_enter (may become dangerous)
// skip io_uring_register (may become dangerous)
// skip io_uring_setup (may become dangerous)
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ipc));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(kcmp));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(kexec_file_load));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(kexec_load));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(keyctl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(kill));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(landlock_add_rule));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(landlock_create_ruleset));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(landlock_restrict_self));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(lchown));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(lchown32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(lgetxattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(link));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(linkat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(listen));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(listxattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(llistxattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(_llseek));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(lock));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(lookup_dcookie));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(lremovexattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(lseek));
// skip lsetxattr (dangerous)
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(lstat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(lstat64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(madvise));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(map_shadow_stack));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mbind));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(membarrier));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(memfd_create));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(memfd_secret));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(migrate_pages));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mincore));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mkdir));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mkdirat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mknod));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mknodat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mlock));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mlock2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mlockall));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mmap));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mmap2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(modify_ldt));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mount));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mount_setattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(move_mount));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(move_pages));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mprotect));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mpx));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mq_getsetattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mq_notify));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mq_open));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mq_timedreceive));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mq_timedreceive_time64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mq_timedsend));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mq_timedsend_time64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mq_unlink));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(mremap));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(msgctl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(msgget));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(msgrcv));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(msgsnd));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(msync));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(multiplexer));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(munlock));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(munlockall));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(munmap));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(name_to_handle_at));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(nanosleep));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(newfstatat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(_newselect));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(nfsservctl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(nice));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(oldfstat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(oldlstat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(oldolduname));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(oldstat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(olduname));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(open));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(openat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(openat2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(open_by_handle_at));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(open_tree));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pause));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pciconfig_iobase));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pciconfig_read));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pciconfig_write));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(perf_event_open));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(personality));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pidfd_getfd));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pidfd_open));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pidfd_send_signal));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pipe));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pipe2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pivot_root));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pkey_alloc));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pkey_free));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pkey_mprotect));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(poll));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ppoll));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ppoll_time64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(prctl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pread64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(preadv));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(preadv2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(prlimit64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(process_madvise));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(process_mrelease));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(process_vm_readv));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(process_vm_writev));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(prof));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(profil));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pselect6));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pselect6_time64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ptrace));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(putpmsg));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pwrite64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pwritev));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(pwritev2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(query_module));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(quotactl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(quotactl_fd));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(read));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(readahead));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(readdir));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(readlink));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(readlinkat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(readv));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(reboot));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(recv));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(recvfrom));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(recvmmsg));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(recvmmsg_time64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(recvmsg));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(remap_file_pages));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(removexattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rename));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(renameat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(renameat2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(request_key));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(restart_syscall));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(riscv_flush_icache));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rmdir));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rseq));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rtas));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rt_sigaction));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rt_sigpending));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rt_sigprocmask));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rt_sigqueueinfo));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rt_sigreturn));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rt_sigsuspend));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rt_sigtimedwait));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rt_sigtimedwait_time64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(rt_tgsigqueueinfo));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(s390_guarded_storage));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(s390_pci_mmio_read));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(s390_pci_mmio_write));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(s390_runtime_instr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(s390_sthyi));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_getaffinity));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_getattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_getparam));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_get_priority_max));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_get_priority_min));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_getscheduler));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_rr_get_interval));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_rr_get_interval_time64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_setaffinity));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_setattr));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_setparam));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_setscheduler));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sched_yield));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(seccomp));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(security));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(select));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(semctl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(semget));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(semop));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(semtimedop));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(semtimedop_time64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(send));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sendfile));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sendfile64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sendmmsg));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sendmsg));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sendto));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setdomainname));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setfsgid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setfsgid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setfsuid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setfsuid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setgid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setgid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setgroups));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setgroups32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sethostname));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setitimer));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(set_mempolicy));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(set_mempolicy_home_node));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setns));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setpgid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setpriority));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setregid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setregid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setresgid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setresgid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setresuid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setresuid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setreuid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setreuid32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setrlimit));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(set_robust_list));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setsid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setsockopt));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(set_thread_area));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(set_tid_address));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(settimeofday));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(set_tls));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setuid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(setuid32));
// skip setxattr (dangerous)
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sgetmask));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(shmat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(shmctl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(shmdt));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(shmget));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(shutdown));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sigaction));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sigaltstack));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(signal));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(signalfd));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(signalfd4));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sigpending));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sigprocmask));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sigreturn));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sigsuspend));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(socket));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(socketcall));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(socketpair));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(splice));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(spu_create));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(spu_run));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ssetmask));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(stat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(stat64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(statfs));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(statfs64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(statx));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(stime));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(stty));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(subpage_prot));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(swapcontext));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(swapoff));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(swapon));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(switch_endian));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(symlink));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(symlinkat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sync));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sync_file_range));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sync_file_range2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(syncfs));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(syscall));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(_sysctl));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sys_debug_setcontext));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sysfs));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sysinfo));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(syslog));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(sysmips));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(tee));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(tgkill));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(time));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timer_create));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timer_delete));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timerfd));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timerfd_create));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timerfd_gettime));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timerfd_gettime64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timerfd_settime));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timerfd_settime64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timer_getoverrun));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timer_gettime));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timer_gettime64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timer_settime));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(timer_settime64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(times));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(tkill));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(truncate));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(truncate64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(tuxcall));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ugetrlimit));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ulimit));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(umask));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(umount));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(umount2));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(uname));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(unlink));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(unlinkat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(unshare));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(uselib));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(userfaultfd));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(usr26));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(usr32));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(ustat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(utime));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(utimensat));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(utimensat_time64));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(utimes));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(vfork));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(vhangup));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(vm86));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(vm86old));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(vmsplice));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(vserver));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(wait4));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(waitid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(waitpid));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(write));
allowSyscall(ctx, SCMP_SYS(writev));
// END extract-syscalls
// chmod family: prevent adding setuid/setgid bits to existing files.
// The Nix store does not support setuid/setgid, and even their temporary creation can weaken the security of the sandbox.
ALLOW_CHMOD_IF_SAFE(ctx, SCMP_SYS(chmod), 1);
ALLOW_CHMOD_IF_SAFE(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fchmod), 1);
ALLOW_CHMOD_IF_SAFE(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fchmodat), 2);
ALLOW_CHMOD_IF_SAFE(ctx, SCMP_SYS(fchmodat2), 2);
// setxattr family: prevent creation of extended attributes or ACLs.
// Not all filesystems support them, and they're incompatible with the NAR format.
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(ENOTSUP), SCMP_SYS(setxattr), 0) != 0 ||
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(ENOTSUP), SCMP_SYS(lsetxattr), 0) != 0 ||
seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(ENOTSUP), SCMP_SYS(fsetxattr), 0) != 0)
throw SysError("unable to add seccomp rule");
Pipe filterPipe;
filterPipe.create();
auto filterBytes_ = std::async([&]() {
return drainFD(filterPipe.readSide.get());
});
if (seccomp_export_bpf(ctx, filterPipe.writeSide.get()) != 0)
throw SysError("unable to compile seccomp BPF program");
filterPipe.writeSide.close();
auto filterBytes = filterBytes_.get();
assert(filterBytes.size() % sizeof(struct sock_filter) == 0);
std::vector<struct sock_filter> filter(filterBytes.size() / sizeof(struct sock_filter));
std::memcpy(filter.data(), filterBytes.data(), filterBytes.size());
return filter;
}
static const std::vector<struct sock_filter> &getSyscallFilter()
{
static auto filter = compileSyscallFilter();
return filter;
}
#endif
void LinuxLocalDerivationGoal::setupSyscallFilter()
{
// Set the NO_NEW_PRIVS prctl flag.
// This both makes loading seccomp filters work for unprivileged users,
// and is an additional security measure in its own right.
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1)
throw SysError("PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS failed");
#if HAVE_SECCOMP
const auto &seccompBPF = getSyscallFilter();
assert(seccompBPF.size() <= std::numeric_limits<unsigned short>::max());
struct sock_fprog fprog = {
.len = static_cast<unsigned short>(seccompBPF.size()),
// the kernel does not actually write to the filter
.filter = const_cast<struct sock_filter *>(seccompBPF.data()),
};
if (syscall(SYS_seccomp, SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &fprog) != 0)
throw SysError("unable to load seccomp BPF program");
#endif
}
void LinuxLocalDerivationGoal::prepareSandbox()
{
/* Create a temporary directory in which we set up the chroot
environment using bind-mounts. We put it in the Nix store
to ensure that we can create hard-links to non-directory
inputs in the fake Nix store in the chroot (see below). */
chrootRootDir = worker.store.Store::toRealPath(drvPath) + ".chroot";
deletePath(chrootRootDir);
/* Clean up the chroot directory automatically. */
autoDelChroot = std::make_shared<AutoDelete>(chrootRootDir);
printMsg(lvlChatty, "setting up chroot environment in '%1%'", chrootRootDir);
// FIXME: make this 0700
if (mkdir(chrootRootDir.c_str(), buildUser && buildUser->getUIDCount() != 1 ? 0755 : 0750) == -1)
throw SysError("cannot create '%1%'", chrootRootDir);
if (buildUser && chown(chrootRootDir.c_str(), buildUser->getUIDCount() != 1 ? buildUser->getUID() : 0, buildUser->getGID()) == -1)
throw SysError("cannot change ownership of '%1%'", chrootRootDir);
/* Create a writable /tmp in the chroot. Many builders need
this. (Of course they should really respect $TMPDIR
instead.) */
Path chrootTmpDir = chrootRootDir + "/tmp";
createDirs(chrootTmpDir);
chmodPath(chrootTmpDir, 01777);
/* Create a /etc/passwd with entries for the build user and the
nobody account. The latter is kind of a hack to support
Samba-in-QEMU. */
createDirs(chrootRootDir + "/etc");
if (parsedDrv->useUidRange())
chownToBuilder(chrootRootDir + "/etc");
if (parsedDrv->useUidRange() && (!buildUser || buildUser->getUIDCount() < 65536))
throw Error("feature 'uid-range' requires the setting '%s' to be enabled", settings.autoAllocateUids.name);
/* Create /etc/hosts with localhost entry. */
if (derivationType->isSandboxed())
writeFile(chrootRootDir + "/etc/hosts", "127.0.0.1 localhost\n::1 localhost\n");
/* Make the closure of the inputs available in the chroot,
rather than the whole Nix store. This prevents any access
to undeclared dependencies. Directories are bind-mounted,
while other inputs are hard-linked (since only directories
can be bind-mounted). !!! As an extra security
precaution, make the fake Nix store only writable by the
build user. */
Path chrootStoreDir = chrootRootDir + worker.store.storeDir;
createDirs(chrootStoreDir);
chmodPath(chrootStoreDir, 01775);
if (buildUser && chown(chrootStoreDir.c_str(), 0, buildUser->getGID()) == -1)
throw SysError("cannot change ownership of '%1%'", chrootStoreDir);
for (auto & i : inputPaths) {
auto p = worker.store.printStorePath(i);
Path r = worker.store.toRealPath(p);
pathsInChroot.insert_or_assign(p, r);
}
/* If we're repairing, checking or rebuilding part of a
multiple-outputs derivation, it's possible that we're
rebuilding a path that is in settings.sandbox-paths
(typically the dependencies of /bin/sh). Throw them
out. */
for (auto & i : drv->outputsAndOptPaths(worker.store)) {
/* If the name isn't known a priori (i.e. floating
content-addressed derivation), the temporary location we use
should be fresh. Freshness means it is impossible that the path
is already in the sandbox, so we don't need to worry about
removing it. */
if (i.second.second)
pathsInChroot.erase(worker.store.printStorePath(*i.second.second));
}
if (cgroup) {
if (mkdir(cgroup->c_str(), 0755) != 0)
throw SysError("creating cgroup '%s'", *cgroup);
chownToBuilder(*cgroup);
chownToBuilder(*cgroup + "/cgroup.procs");
chownToBuilder(*cgroup + "/cgroup.threads");
//chownToBuilder(*cgroup + "/cgroup.subtree_control");
}
}
Pid LinuxLocalDerivationGoal::startChild(std::function<void()> openSlave)
{
#if HAVE_SECCOMP
// Our seccomp filter program is surprisingly expensive to compile (~10ms).
// For this reason, we precompile it once and then cache it.
// This has to be done in the parent so that all builds get to use the same cache.
getSyscallFilter();
#endif
// If we're not sandboxing no need to faff about, use the fallback
if (!useChroot) {
return LocalDerivationGoal::startChild(openSlave);
}
/* Set up private namespaces for the build:
- The PID namespace causes the build to start as PID 1.
Processes outside of the chroot are not visible to those
on the inside, but processes inside the chroot are
visible from the outside (though with different PIDs).
- The private mount namespace ensures that all the bind
mounts we do will only show up in this process and its
children, and will disappear automatically when we're
done.
- The private network namespace ensures that the builder
cannot talk to the outside world (or vice versa). It
only has a private loopback interface. (Fixed-output
derivations are not run in a private network namespace
to allow functions like fetchurl to work.)
- The IPC namespace prevents the builder from communicating
with outside processes using SysV IPC mechanisms (shared
memory, message queues, semaphores). It also ensures
that all IPC objects are destroyed when the builder
exits.
- The UTS namespace ensures that builders see a hostname of
localhost rather than the actual hostname.
We use a helper process to do the clone() to work around
clone() being broken in multi-threaded programs due to
at-fork handlers not being run. Note that we use
CLONE_PARENT to ensure that the real builder is parented to
us.
*/
if (derivationType->isSandboxed())
privateNetwork = true;
userNamespaceSync.create();
Pipe sendPid;
sendPid.create();
Pid helper = startProcess([&]() {
sendPid.readSide.close();
/* We need to open the slave early, before
CLONE_NEWUSER. Otherwise we get EPERM when running as
root. */
openSlave();
/* Drop additional groups here because we can't do it
after we've created the new user namespace. */
if (setgroups(0, 0) == -1) {
if (errno != EPERM)
throw SysError("setgroups failed");
if (settings.requireDropSupplementaryGroups)
throw Error("setgroups failed. Set the require-drop-supplementary-groups option to false to skip this step.");
}
ProcessOptions options;
options.cloneFlags = CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWIPC | CLONE_NEWUTS | CLONE_PARENT | SIGCHLD;
if (privateNetwork)
options.cloneFlags |= CLONE_NEWNET;
if (usingUserNamespace)
options.cloneFlags |= CLONE_NEWUSER;
pid_t child = startProcess([&]() { runChild(); }, options).release();
writeFull(sendPid.writeSide.get(), fmt("%d\n", child));
_exit(0);
});
sendPid.writeSide.close();
if (helper.wait() != 0)
throw Error("unable to start build process");
userNamespaceSync.readSide.reset();
/* Close the write side to prevent runChild() from hanging
reading from this. */
Finally cleanup([&]() {
userNamespaceSync.writeSide.reset();
});
auto ss = tokenizeString<std::vector<std::string>>(readLine(sendPid.readSide.get()));
assert(ss.size() == 1);
Pid pid = Pid{string2Int<pid_t>(ss[0]).value()};
if (usingUserNamespace) {
/* Set the UID/GID mapping of the builder's user namespace
such that the sandbox user maps to the build user, or to
the calling user (if build users are disabled). */
uid_t hostUid = buildUser ? buildUser->getUID() : getuid();
uid_t hostGid = buildUser ? buildUser->getGID() : getgid();
uid_t nrIds = buildUser ? buildUser->getUIDCount() : 1;
writeFile("/proc/" + std::to_string(pid.get()) + "/uid_map",
fmt("%d %d %d", sandboxUid(), hostUid, nrIds));
if (!buildUser || buildUser->getUIDCount() == 1)
writeFile("/proc/" + std::to_string(pid.get()) + "/setgroups", "deny");
writeFile("/proc/" + std::to_string(pid.get()) + "/gid_map",
fmt("%d %d %d", sandboxGid(), hostGid, nrIds));
} else {
debug("note: not using a user namespace");
}
/* Now that we now the sandbox uid, we can write
/etc/passwd. */
writeFile(chrootRootDir + "/etc/passwd", fmt(
"root:x:0:0:Nix build user:%3%:/noshell\n"
"nixbld:x:%1%:%2%:Nix build user:%3%:/noshell\n"
"nobody:x:65534:65534:Nobody:/:/noshell\n",
sandboxUid(), sandboxGid(), settings.sandboxBuildDir));
/* Declare the build user's group so that programs get a consistent
view of the system (e.g., "id -gn"). */
writeFile(chrootRootDir + "/etc/group",
fmt("root:x:0:\n"
"nixbld:!:%1%:\n"
"nogroup:x:65534:\n", sandboxGid()));
/* Save the mount- and user namespace of the child. We have to do this
*before* the child does a chroot. */
sandboxMountNamespace = AutoCloseFD{open(fmt("/proc/%d/ns/mnt", pid.get()).c_str(), O_RDONLY)};
if (sandboxMountNamespace.get() == -1)
throw SysError("getting sandbox mount namespace");
if (usingUserNamespace) {
sandboxUserNamespace = AutoCloseFD{open(fmt("/proc/%d/ns/user", pid.get()).c_str(), O_RDONLY)};
if (sandboxUserNamespace.get() == -1)
throw SysError("getting sandbox user namespace");
}
/* Move the child into its own cgroup. */
if (cgroup)
writeFile(*cgroup + "/cgroup.procs", fmt("%d", pid.get()));
/* Signal the builder that we've updated its user namespace. */
writeFull(userNamespaceSync.writeSide.get(), "1");
return pid;
}
void LinuxLocalDerivationGoal::killSandbox(bool getStats)
{
if (cgroup) {
auto stats = destroyCgroup(*cgroup);
if (getStats) {
buildResult.cpuUser = stats.cpuUser;
buildResult.cpuSystem = stats.cpuSystem;
}
} else {
LocalDerivationGoal::killSandbox(getStats);
}
}
}
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